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1 Introduction 
 
English law most likely is still and will continue to be prominent in the world of shipping. 
That is why an English court decision, especially one that is related to shipping, may be of 
significant importance to the world of the shipping industry and possibly having a great 
impact on the industry. 
 
Fishing and navigation are the oldest uses of the sea. Approximately ninety-five percent of 
goods for international trade are seaborne.1 Thus, ships still play important role in today’s 
world transport industry. With life expectancy between 20 – 30 years ships can be 
categorized as long-term assets. Hence with a ship, many times will we encounter multiple 
transfers of ownership between many parties.  
 
The most common ways for people to acquire a ship is by shipbuilding contracts (with 
shipyard as the seller and customer as buyer) and by purchasing a second-hand vessel.2 
However, the latter would represent a much quicker and cheaper alternative to a 
shipbuilding project. Admittedly, the process of buying and selling second-hand ships is 
becoming more popular and becoming a very important activity in shipping industries, one 
with potentially serious legal consequences.3  
 
As in most shipping contracts, there are several standard forms for the purpose of sale and 
purchase transactions of second-hand vessels. The individual agreements are usually 
negotiated by exchanging amended versions of the electronic template and eventually 
                                                
1 (Churchill and Lowe 1999) p.255  
2 Other ways of acquiring a ship, among others through shipbuidling contracts, second-
hand purchase, auction, by obtaining a majority shareholding in a shipowning corporation 
etc. 
3 (Strong and Herring 2010) p.xix 
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consolidating all changes in a final document subject to approval or details.4 This type of 
agreement usually referred as MOA, and among those standard form contracts the most 
popular standard form for sale and purchase of second-hand vessels is the NSF in particular 
the NSF 1993 version (“NSF 93”).5   
 
Despite its popularity, virtually every one of their 16 clauses has proved to be a fertile 
ground for dispute between sellers and buyers.6 On 13th December 2012, the English Court 
had made a controversial judgment regarding the relationship between the NSF 93 and the 
SGA in an English law governed MOA. It has always been the subject of some speculation 
as to whether the NSF (both 1987 and 1993 versions) is an “as is, where is” contract that 
excludes terms as to satisfactory quality and fitness for purpose, which are implied into 
contracts of sale by the SGA. Nevertheless with the recent decision in Dalmare SpA v 
Union Maritime Ltd and Valor Shipping Ltd7 (“Union Power”) has now given a little 
authority to such speculation.  
 
However, following to Union Power, a recent English Court decision in 2014 namely 
Michael Hirtenstein and Il Sole Limited v. Hill Dickinson LLP (the “Hirtenstein”),8 has 
shed some doubt on the Union Power decision in regards to the application of the implied 
terms in “as is” contracts. 
 
 
                                                
4 (Falkanger, Bull and Brautaset 2011) p.77 
5 The Saleform now has its latest revision in 2012. Many references claim the NSF as the 
most widely used for sale and purchase of second-hand vessel. 
6 (Strong and Herring 2010) p.xv 
7 Dalmare SpA v Union Maritime Ltd & Valor Shipping Ltd (The Union Power) [2012] 
EWHC 3537 (Comm) (13 December 2012) 
8 [2014] EWCH 2711 (Comm) 
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1.1 The research topic 
 
The Union Power decision is maybe one of the landmark decisions of the century. The 
writer feels it is necessary to undertake an analysis study of the decision, in particular on 
how the court can reach and come to such decision, since it can also have possible 
implications for sale and purchase contracts more generally. 
 
According to NSF 93, sales are undertaken on the basis of the pre-contractual inspection of 
the vessel by the prospective buyer, which is also covered by the promises of the seller to 
deliver it in the same condition as inspected. In addition the vessel shall also be delivered 
with the agreed classification notation maintained free of average damage affecting class, 
together with the usual drydocking clause. As such, it is assumed that the buyer will have 
no more rights of protection other than the aforementioned. However, it was almost 
universally accepted that the NSF and in particular the NSF 93 was able to exclude terms 
as to satisfactory quality and fitness for purpose, which are implied into English law-
governed contracts of sale by the SGA. But through the Union Power decision, the English 
High Court has turned those retained understandings up side down and put this debate to 
rest as it has been held that the implied term of satisfactory quality and fitness purpose of 
SGA are indeed to be implied into a English law-governed MOA using the NSF.  
 
In addition, the court went further on the decision and made a provisional view that the 
words “as is, where is” apparently also do not exclude the statutory implied terms. It only 
excludes the right to reject the vessel upon delivery due to breach of statutory implied 
conditions, but leaving unaffected the right to claim damages for the buyer. Therefore with 
the inception of this decision, the public should also pay more attention to the legal 
principle Caveat Venditor (Seller Beware) because apparently sellers can be pursued by the 
buyer alleging for breaches of statutory implied terms after delivery.  
 
However a recent authority, namely the Hirtenstein, gave some contradictory views about 
the application of the implied terms on “as is” contracts. It was suggested that applying the 
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implied terms in “as is” contracts may be contrary to the expectations of ordinary business 
people and too generous to the buyer. 
 
Thus, this thesis will analyse and focus on questions raised in the Union Power decision i.e. 
(i) whether NSF 1993 is an “as is, where is” contract with the effect of excluding the 
statutory implied terms as of satisfactory quality? And the comparison between the 
approach taken in the Union Power and the Hirtenstein decisions as to (ii) whether the 
words “as is”, if they had been included in the sale contracts, would have been sufficient to 
exclude the statutory implied terms as to satisfactory quality and fitness for purpose, from 
the said decisions. As well as (iii) how one can safely exclude the implied terms in the NSF 
in particular, and in other sale and purchase contracts under English law? 
 
1.2 The purpose of the thesis 
 
Even though the NSF 93, together with its previous version, are used as boilerplates for the 
sale and purchase of second-hand vessels, this standard form has rather high potential to 
create disputes between sellers and buyers. This is maybe due to arbitration being the most 
frequently used dispute settlement forum in resolving disputes concerning sale and 
purchase of second-hand vessel using the NSF. As a result, the award given in the process 
will be confidential and exclusively intended to the disputing parties, leaving nothing to be 
learned for other players in the shipping industry in order not to repeat the same mistakes 
or to guide when considering how the terms of the NSF are drafted and interpreted. 
Therefore the industry does not have enough authority to refer to. This inability to learn 
from the disputes arose means that certain beliefs and practices associated with the use of 
the standard forms within the industry can apparently be incorrect. 
 
This is what exactly happened in the Union Power case. The court unexpectedly concluded 
that statutory implied terms in the SGA did apply to contracts of sale of second-hand 
vessels using the NSF as standard forms which were governed by English law. A clear and 
unequivocal wording is apparently very much needed in order to exclude such statutory 
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implied terms. Furthermore, the judgment also has wider contractual implications 
extending beyond ship sale and purchase because the judge expressed a provisional view 
on the scope of the words “as is where is”, which appear frequently in contracts for the sale 
and purchase of goods generally and not merely contracts for the sale of second-hand ships. 
 
Conversely, in the recent Hirtenstein decision the judge expressed a differing view on the 
meaning of the words “as is where is” and whether they are sufficient to exclude the 
implied terms of SGA as to satisfactory quality and fitness for purpose.  
 
Therefore this thesis will look at those issues, and consider how these implied terms can be 
excluded or retained, depending on the intention of the parties. This thesis will discuss the 
courts’ material findings and highlight areas of consideration for those drafting or making 
use of the NSF form, or indeed an MOA of any type. So that readers, especially players in 
the industry, can be fully informed of the consequences of their choices and the 
documentation effectively sets down their agreement. 
 
1.3 Method and sources 
 
The methodology that is used in writing this thesis is based on an analysis of primary and 
secondary sources in regards to the topic. The observation of relevant English law cases 
becomes a significant element of this thesis. The observation of relevant legal cases as 
regards to the topic is conducted in sequential order. However, as the court had rendered a 
significant outcome in the Union Power case, this thesis will give attention to the 
application of English law in the NSF 93. And English law shall provide the legal 
framework for the analysis of the topic with legal sources that are used as follows:  
 
This thesis will heavily rely on the decision of the High Court of England by the 
honourable Mr. Justice Flaux between Dalmare SpA v. Union Maritime Ltd & Valor 
 6 
Shipping Ltd, dated 13 December 2012.9 In addition this thesis will also rely on and discuss 
a subsequent English law decision namely Hirtenstein v. Hill Dickinson LLP,10 which shed 
some contradictory views about the application of implied terms in “as is” contracts. 
Finally as a supplementary resource for this thesis other decisions from common law 
jurisdiction regarding the application of the SGA’s implied terms, or “as is” principle in a 
sale contract will be used which the writer found to be interesting, relevant and of potential 
interest to the readers. This thesis is not meant to be an exhaustive observation of every 
decision connected to the topic: it focuses on the most influential judgements only.    
 
As the case was rooted in the interpretation of a phrase in the NSF 93, it will substantially 
rely on the said NSF and also its predecessor as well as successor versions as legal sources. 
 
Statutory acts, in particular the SGA, are further important legal sources for this thesis, as 
the discussion will significantly refer to this act. 
 
Writings of scholars and practitioners on the Union Power case and Hirtenstein case, the 
NSF, as well as the SGA are also valuable resources in the writing of this thesis. 
 
1.4 Outline of the thesis 
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis comprises the introduction, thesis purposes, method and structure, 
and lastly the thesis outline. 
 
Then, the rest of this thesis will be structured as follows: 
• Chapter 2 of the thesis will provide a discussion about the relationship between the 
NSF 93 and the SGA; 
                                                
9  [2012] EWHC 3537 (Comm) 
10 [2014] EWHC 2711 (Comm) 
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• Chapter 3 of the thesis will provide an analysis of the English law approach taken 
by the judge in the case of the Union Power decision; 
• Chapter 4 of the thesis will provide an analysis of the approach that the judge in 
Hirtenstein case took in interpreting  “as is, where is” in sale and purchase contracts 
and a discussion about “Entire Agreement” clause in the NSF 2012 as one of the 
solutions to safely exclude the statutory implied terms; 
• Lastly, Chapter 5 of the thesis will provide conclusion and further suggestion.   
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2 Relationship between the NSF and SGA 
 
2.1 Basic classification of terms 
 
English law recognizes that not all contractual obligations are of equal importance to the 
parties. Breaches of certain types of terms constitute repudiatory breaches, while breaches 
of other terms only give the right to claim damages for the non-breaching parties. It is 
therefore necessary to determine the classification of terms for this purpose, to consider the 
type of term broken and therefore whether this breach is repudiatory.11 
 
For the above purpose there are three basic types of terms: 
• Conditions are important terms which are said “to go to the root of the contract”; if 
they are broken, the breach is generally regarded as repudiatory. The non-breaching 
party will have the option of terminating the contract for the future or affirming it, in 
addition to the remedy of damages. Conditions can be directly contrasted with 
warranties. 
• Warranties are less important terms which do not “go to the root of the contract”; the 
breach of such a term can be adequately compensated with a remedy of damages. 
Accordingly, breach of warranty is not a repudiatory breach and there can be no option 
for the non-breaching party to terminate or affirm. The only remedy for the non-
breaching party will be damages. 
• Innominate (or intermediate) terms defy rigid classification but appear to lie 
somewhere between a condition and warranty and might best be described as the type 
of term which may be broken in a number of different ways, not all of which would be 
serious. Therefore, whether a breach of an innominate term constitutes a repudiatory 
breach, giving rise to the option to terminate or affirm, will depend upon the effects of 
the breach and whether these effects are serious. If the effects are serious, the breach 
                                                
11 Poole (2012) p.290 
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will be repudiatory and there is an option to terminate or affirm; whereas if the effects 
are not serious, the non-breaching party will be limited to a remedy of damages.12 
 
The parties to a contract may, by wording used in the contract, agree that certain terms are 
to have the status of conditions. Courts have the power to look at the context in which such 
terms are used to see if the parties really intended that any breach of such term (however 
minor) would entitle the innocent party to terminate the contract.13 From the authority in 
Schuler (L.) A.G. v. Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd.,14 the House of Lords ruled that 
merely because a term of a contract was described as a condition did not necessarily mean 
it was a condition, and justified its decision by reference to the true intention of the 
parties.15 
 
It should also be noted that the description of a contractual term as a warranty may also not 
be determinative of the status of that term: the courts have the power to consider whether 
the parties really intended that no breach of such a warranty (however significant) could 
entitle the innocent party to terminate the contract.16 
 
Therefore, condition and warranties may be identified by reference to legislation, express 
wording used in the contract in question, and decisions in court cases and arbitration 
proceedings.17 
                                                
12 Ibid. p.289, 290 
13 (Goldrein, Hannaford and Turner 2008) p.79 
14 [1973] 2 Llyod’s Rep. 53; [1974] AC. 235 (H.L.) 
15 “The fact that a particular construction leads to a very unreasonable result must be a 
relevant consideration. The more unreasonable the result the more unlikely it is that the 
parties can have intended it; and if they do intend it the more necessary it is that they shall 
make that intention abundantly clear.” 
16  (Goldrein, Hannaford and Turner 2008) p.79; see also Cehave N.V. v. Bremer 
Handelsgesellschaft m.b.H., The Hansa Nord [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.445 at 457 
17 (Goldrein, Hannaford and Turner 2008) p.67 
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Nevertheless, terms amounted as conditions can be excluded by the parties in an agreement 
with express agreement-which must be inconsistent with the SGA, a course of dealing 
between the parties, and usage (i.e. custom of the trade) which binds both parties.18  
 
2.2 The NSF  
 
2.2.1 Brief History and Development of the NSF 
 
The purpose of having standardized forms for the purpose of sale and purchase transactions 
of second-hand vessels, as well as for many other shipping contracts, is to save time and 
legal expenses compared with creating such a contract from scratch. The forms under 
which second-hand ships were historically bought and sold are now inevitably lost in the 
mist of history,19 but the NSF was and always be one of the leading forms for sale and 
purchase of second-hand ships. The NSF is believed to have been first issued more than 
100 years ago. The earliest revision of the form in English is a 1948 copy entitled 
Memorandum of Agreement.20  
 
The NSF was revised and adopted by The Baltic and International Maritime Conference 
(“BIMCO”) in 1956.21 It was subsequently revised from time to time to conform to legal 
development and the evolving industry practice. In general such revised versions more or 
less cover the same ground such as: the identity of the seller and the buyer; brief 
description of the vessel to be sold; price and required deposit as well as place of payment; 
                                                
18 SGA section 55 
19 (Strong and Herring 2010), p.1 
20 Ibid.  
21 From 1956 the Saleform was revised five times, i.e. in 1966, 1983, 1987, 1993, and 
2012.  
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vessel inspection and drydocking or underwater inspection; the sale of bunkers remaining 
on board; the requirement for a transfer document and a certificate of deletion; an 
undertaking that the vessel is free from encumbrances and maritime liens at the time of 
delivery; also consequences if either party fails to perform its obligation as well as provide 
for arbitration.22  
 
The 1948 revision of the form was perhaps the most modest version compared to later 
revised versions, as each revision becomes somewhat longer. For example, the issue of 
condition of the vessel on delivery, which in recent years has become the largest cause of 
disputes between sellers and buyers, is only briefly referred to in the printed text of the 
1948 revision as follows: “The vessel, with everything belonging to her, stores, etc. shall be 
taken over as she is and the Vendor shall not be held responsible for possible faults and 
deficiencies.” The 1956 and 1966 revisions of the form, in general did not fundamentally 
alter the contractual balance between the parties.23 
 
However, the first major shift in the balance between the parties was incorporated in NSF 
1983 - that the vessel be delivered with present class free of recommendations and 
providing for notification to the Classification Society of any matters coming to the seller’s 
knowledge prior to delivery, which upon being reported to the Classification Society would 
lead to withdrawal of the vessel’s class, or to the imposition of a recommendation relating 
to her class.24  
 
In 1987 the NSF was again amended by the revision in NSF 1987. This version is 150 lines 
long, and it still does not aim to be comprehensive and leaves it to the parties to add such 
further clauses in an appendix as they require. The basic character of the NSF as an 
“absolute” sale agreement and the present tense nature of the language in Clause 11 of the 
NSF remained unchanged. 
                                                
22 (Strong and Herring 2010), p.2 
23 Ibid. 
24 See Norwegian Saleform 1983 cl. 11 
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On February 1994, after 11 years with insignificant changes, finally the NSF underwent 
substantial amendments when the NSF 93 was first published.25 This NSF was intended to 
be more comprehensive than its predecessors. It is 283 lines long and it includes provision 
for nearly all of the topics normally covered under a contract for the sale and purchase of 
second-hand vessels. Such increase is mainly caused by the extension of clauses 6 
(Drydocking/Diver’s Inspection) and 8 (Documentation). It now also contains definitions, 
while a number of capitalized terms in the main text remain undefined. In this version, the 
language in Clause 11 has been changed into past tense form.26 In addition some of the 
definitions are considered less than satisfactory.27 
 
Lastly, the latest version of the Norwegian Shipbrokers’ Association standard MOA for the 
sale and purchase of second-hand vessels is the NSF 2012. It was nearly 20 years after the 
inception of the NSF 93. The growing and widespread practice of amending the printed 
form, often by including several detailed additional clauses shows that the NSF 93 was 
indeed in need of revision. The decision to revise the NSF 93 followed from consultation 
with the global second-hand ship sale sector, it was felt that the industry would benefit 
from a modest update of this widely-used agreement.28 The general principles and structure 
of the NSF have been retained, yet amendments29 have been made to better reflect industry 
practice and to clarify certain issues prone to ambiguity or dispute. Time will eventually 
tell how successful this NSF will be in replacing its predecessor.  
 
                                                
25 (Strong and Herring 2010), p.44 
26 “…, she shall be delivered and taken over as she was at the time of inspection, fair wear 
and tear excepted.” 
27 See the definition of ”Banking Days” and ”in writing” or ”written” in the Saleform 1993. 
28 (Saleform 2012 lansert! 2012) 
29 For example, an “Entire Agreement” clause has been inserted in this 2012 version which 
will result in any previous agreements (whether oral or in writing) between the parties 
being of no further effect as they will have been superseded by the signed MOA. 
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However, any version of the NSF may not always be appropriate or sufficient in all cases. 
Rather, NSF may be regarded as a useful platform which can readily be adapted to the 
circumstances of a specific transaction.30 Therefore sometimes amendments to the MOA 
are needed to meet the objectives of the parties. In spite of that, the advantages of using 
NSF is that the form is more certain, predictable, and widely recognizable. 
 
2.2.2 Express terms on NSF 93 concerning condition of ship  
 
In addition to the above classification, under English law there also is no formal 
requirement for a sale contract to be made in writing. However, in commercial transactions 
it is both sensible and usual for the parties’ contractual relationship to be put in writing. 
Second-hand ship sale contracts are invariably written down and the vast majority of such 
contracts are based on one of the industry standard forms in current use.31  
 
The most relevant clause under the NSF 93 in our case is section 11 as it concerns the 
condition on delivery of the ship. This section is claimed to produce the most disputes 
between sellers and buyers. It has been numbered since the 1956 revision of the Saleform.32 
And the full wording of the section is as follows: 
 
“11. Condition on delivery         216 
The Vessel with everything belonging to her shall be at the Sellers' risk and expense until she is   217 
delivered to the Buyers, but subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement she shall be    218 
delivered and taken over as she was at the time of inspection, fair wear and tear excepted.    219 
However, the Vessel shall be delivered with her class maintained without condition/recommendation*, 220 
                                                
30 (Goldrein, Hannaford and Turner 2008) p.84 
31 Ibid. p.67 
32 (Strong and Herring 2010) p.154 
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free of average damage affecting the Vessel's class, and with her classification certificates and    221 
national certificates, as well as all other certificates the Vessel had at the time of inspection, valid and 222  
unextended without condition/recommendation* by Class or the relevant authorities at the time of        223 
delivery.           224 
"Inspection" in this Clause 11, shall mean the Buyers' inspection according to Clause 4 a) or 4 b), if    225 
applicable, or the Buyers' inspection prior to the signing of this Agreement. If the Vessel is taken over  226 
without inspection, the date of this Agreement shall be the relevant date.                           227 
*Notes, if any, in the surveyor's reports which are accepted by the Classification Society     228 
without condition/recommendation are not to be taken into account.                                229“ 
 
Based on the above, we can see that there are express terms regarding the condition of the 
ship, as follows: 
 
2.2.2.1 Maintaining vessel’s class free from condition/recommendation 
 
The requirement that the vessel be class maintained free of recommendations began life as 
an additional clause commonly added to NSF 1966.33 This phrase has a consequence that a 
vessel can be delivered not in the same condition as when it was inspected (in a sense, in a 
better condition). This is because, for example, the seller had altered the condition of the 
vessel so as to comply with class condition/recommendation, if he had become obliged 
between inspection and delivery. Any existence conditions/recommendations must be 
deleted prior delivery. The same applies to conditions/recommendations which may have 
arisen at a later stage, e.g. in connection with inspections pursuant to clause 6 
                                                
33 (Crookenden 2008) 
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(Drydockings/Divers Inspection).34 As a consequence, there is a possibility for the seller to 
deliver the vessel in a better condition than when the vessel was inspected by the buyer.   
 
The Court of Appeal in Buena Trader35 held the clause to be satisfied as long as the vessel 
was in class without recommendations even if the vessel suffered from defects of which the 
sellers were aware, that had they been notified to the classification society, would have 
resulted in class being withdrawn or a recommendation imposed. 
 
In addition to the decisions in the said Buena Trader and also Alfred Trigon36 we can see 
the generally accepted interpretation of the obligation to deliver in Class is that this is a 
“paper obligation” which can only be satisfied by production of a certificate from the 
classification society that the vessel maintains her class, provided of course that it does not 
make any reference to outstanding recommendations.37  
 
2.2.2.2 Free of average damage affecting class 
 
Previously this phrase was a common additional clause to the NSF. In 1993 this phrase 
became part of the MOA, as it was included in the NSF 93.38 A vessel may have suffered 
damage which has not yet led to any reaction from class. This clause obliges the seller to 
have such damage repaired, provided that it can be categorized as “average damage 
affecting the Vessel’s class”.39 From the decision of the Alfred Trigon we can see that this 
is to mean damage affecting class which had been caused by a peril ordinarily covered by 
                                                
34 (Falkanger, Bull and Brautaset 2011) p.116 
35 Compania de Navegacion Pohing SA v Sea Tanker Shipping (Pte) Ltd (the Buena 
Trader) [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 325 CA 
36 Piccinini v Partrederiet Trigon II (the Alfred Trigon) [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 333 CA. 
37 Strong (2010) p.161 
38 (Crookenden 2008) 
39 (Falkanger, Bull and Brautaset 2011) p.117  
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insurance. In other words, the vessel must have sustained damage recoverable under 
ordinary hull insurance.40 It does not, therefore, cover defects arising through wear and tear 
and general old age. This interpretation was also adopted by Bingham J. in The Star of 
Kuwait41 and by Leggatt J. in The Great Marine42. This express term may cause the seller 
to deliver the ship in a better condition than the condition on inspection. 
  
2.2.2.3 Condition as at the time of inspection, fair wear and tear excepted 
 
The requirement for the vessel to be delivered with a “clean record” may cause the seller to 
bear some risk for “fair wear and tear”.43 This obligation has not given rise to much 
difficulty of interpretation but factual issues can arise as to what, in fact, was the condition 
of the vessel at the time of inspection and whether damage was due to fair wear and tear.44 
Also, after some time, the effects of wear and tear may be so extensive that 
recommendations will be imposed by class. This again places a duty to repair on the seller. 
 
2.2.2.4 Obligation to notify class of matter coming to seller’s attention 
 
The Seller’s obligation to “notify classification society of any matter coming to their 
knowledge, prior to delivery, which may lead to recommendation against class” was 
introduced 1983 revision of the NSF. As a consequence of the decision in the Buena 
Trader, this wording was added in the NSF 1983 and NSF 1987. 
 
                                                
40 Ibid. 
41 Lips Maritime Corp v. National Maritime Agency Co  (the Star of Kuwait) [1982] 2 
Llyod’s Rep. 641 
42 Ateni Maritime Corp v. Great Marine Ltd (the Great Marine) [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 250 
43 (Falkanger, Bull and Brautaset 2011) p.117 
44 (Crookenden 2008) 
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Disputes arose as to whether the sellers’ obligation to notify arose in relation to defects 
coming to their knowledge from: the date of the contract; the last class inspection; buyer’s 
inspection; or some other date.45 These issues were resolved by the Niobe46 in which the 
House of Lords held that there was no time limit as to when sellers became aware of a 
notifiable defect. The seller is obliged to note any defect throughout the whole procedure of 
sale including before the contract is written. The obligation is fulfilled on the date of 
delivery. 
 
Unfortunately, this obligation for the sellers to notify class has been deleted from clause 11 
NSF 93. And it also does not appear in NSF 2012. With this deletion, the buyers’ position 
will be weakened as it reverts back to the position before 1983. However this obligation is 
still often added as an additional clause in NSF 93. 
 
2.2.3 Classification of clause 11 of the NSF 93 and effect of breach 
 
The authority as to whether a breach of an express term of clause 11 of the NSF 93 is a 
breach of a condition to delivery is not entirely clear. From the Aktion47 that was held by 
Hirst J. we can see that obligations as to the vessel’s condition similar to those now found 
in clause 11 NSF 93 do not amount to a conditions precedent to delivery but only 
innominate terms which would only entitle the buyer to reject if the breach is so serious 
that it deprives what the buyer supposedly received (benefit) from seller’s performance as 
intended from the contract. 
 
                                                
45 (Crookenden 2008) 
46 Niobe Maritime Corp. v. Tradax Ocean Transportation SA (the Niobe) [1995] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 579 
47 Aktion Maritime Corporation of Liberia v. S. Kasmas & Brother Ltd. And Others (the 
Aktion) 1 Lloyds Rep 283 
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Hirst J. also held in the same case that NOR for delivery could be served even though the 
vessel was not ready for delivery at the time the notice was served. That part of his decision 
has been contradicted in the Court of Appeal in Zegluga Polska v. T R Shipping48 and has 
in any event been superseded by a revision to the NSF which makes it clear that NOR can 
only be given when the vessel was ready for delivery.49 Clause 5 under NSF 93 now 
provides that NOR can only be given when “the vessel is at the place of delivery and in 
every respect physically ready for delivery in accordance with this agreement.” 
 
As well as reversing the effect of the decision in the Aktion as regards the NOR, the 
revision to clause 5 of the NSF 93 may also have reversed the effect of the decision as 
regards whether compliance with the clause 11 conditions of the NSF 93 is a condition 
precedent to delivery.50 As a consequence it may also have reversed the buyer’s right in 
treating the contract in the event of a breach. 
 
2.3 The SGA 
 
2.3.1 Brief introduction of the SGA 
 
The SGA received its Royal Assent on 6 December 1979 and came into force on 1 January 
1980. It consolidates the law relating to the sale of goods. However, section 14 of the act 
that stipulates implied terms as to satisfactory quality or fitness for purpose were not 
brought into force until 19 May 1985.51  
 
                                                
48 [1998] 2 Lloyds Rep 341. 
49 (Crookenden 2008) 
50 Ibid. 
51 See SGA section 14 (7), (8), and schedule 1 para.9; and SI 1983/1572 
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The SGA was originally named the Sale of Goods Bill. And it was drafted by Sir 
Mackenzie Chalmers in 1888. It was intended to only apply in the common law jurisdiction 
of England, Wales, and Ireland, but in the course of its passage through Parliament it was 
amended so as to extend its operation to Scotland.52  
 
The SGA replaces the Sale of Goods Act 1893 and parts of a number of other enactments, 
and incorporated changes which had already been made in those Acts by amending 
legislation, principally the Consumer Credit Act 1974 section 192 (4) and Schedule 4 
para.3; Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 section 31(2) and Schedule 3, 4.53 
 
Consequently, the SGA is expressed to be retrospective in its effect, so as to apply to all 
contracts of sale of goods made on or after 1 January 1894, when the Act of 1893 became 
operative. The wording of the SGA is not identical with that of the enactments which it 
consolidates, and in particular the definition of some statutory terms is altered. So far as 
concerns contracts made after 1 January 1980, there is no need to look beyond the 
substantive provisions,54 but as regards contracts made earlier than that date, it is necessary 
in the case of particular sections to refer to the transitional provisions set out in Schedule 
1.55 
 
Since its enactment the SGA has been the subject of three amending acts, namely, the 
SGA, Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994, and Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995. It 
has also been subject to a number of minor statutory amendments.56 Changes of much 
greater significance have been introduced by other legislation namely the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977.57  
                                                
52 (Bridge 2010) p.4 
53 (Bridge 2010) p.3 
54 SGA Section 1(4)  
55 (Bridge 2010) p.3 
56 Ibid. p.4 
57 Ibid. 
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The SGA, like its predecessor of 1893, applies to contracts for the sale of all types of 
goods.58 
 
2.3.2 Classification of terms under the SGA 
 
The parties to an agreement should bear in mind that in addition to the express terms set out 
in the contract, other terms may also be read and introduced into the contract even though 
they are not directly stated in written or spoken words. These terms (known as ”implied 
terms”) may be read into the contract as a result of applicable legislation.59 The common 
law relating to the sale of goods was codified by the SGA. This SGA is one example of 
applicable legislation functioning as implied terms in a sale and purchase of goods contract, 
in particular second-hand vessels. 
 
Just as express terms may be classified according to their relative importance, so some 
implied terms are also more important than others. In relation to the sale and purchase of 
second-hand vessels contracts, there are three SGA implied terms which are likely to be of 
most relevance:60 
• Under section 13(1) of the SGA, a contract may be subject to an implied condition that 
the ship will correspond with the description given to her in the contract. 
• By implication, under section 14(2) of the SGA, the ship must be of “satisfactory 
quality”, this carries with it requirement that the ship must meet the standard that a 
“reasonable person” would consider satisfactory having regard to the description and 
price and “all other relevant circumstances”. These other circumstances are not 
exhaustively listed and might include matters such as freedom from minor defects, 
durability and safety, and fitness for purpose. 
                                                
58 Ibid. p.9 
59 (Goldrein, Hannaford and Turner 2008) p.67 
60 Ibid. p.67-68 
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• Under section 14 (3) of the SGA, a “fitness for purpose” condition may be implied into 
the contract. However, this condition will only apply where a ship is being sold in the 
course of business and where the purpose for which the ship is being purchased has 
been made known to sellers, unless it is unreasonable for buyers to rely on the sellers’ 
skill and judgment. 
The above implied terms are treated as conditions of the contracts.61  
 
However, some other types of terms are also reflected in the SGA, for example: 
• Section 11(2) of the SGA represents a condition which gives rise to a right to reject the 
goods and treat the contract as repudiated. However where sellers are in breach of a 
condition, buyers may waive the condition or may elect to treat the breach of condition 
as a breach of warranty and not as a ground for treating the contract as repudiated; 
• Section 61(1) of the SGA represents a warranty which gives rise to a claim for 
damages, but not a right to reject the goods and treat the contract as repudiated; 
• Section 11(3) of the SGA says that whether a given contractual obligation is a 
condition or a warranty will depend in each case on the construction of the contract 
and an obligation may be a condition, although it is called a warranty in the contract. 
This represents innominate terms. 
 
2.3.3 Characteristic of satisfactory quality 
 
Under SGA section 14(2) goods are of “satisfactory quality” if they meet the standard that 
a “reasonable person” would regard as satisfactory. For second-hand goods, in this case 
second-hand vessels, it is not easy to assess their standard. Second-hand vessels may have 
been exposed to numerous hazards of the maritime world, and are bound to have some 
defects. Moreover, assessing the standard which a second-hand ship of a certain age and 
type should be expected to reach is something quite outside the judgement of a “reasonable 
                                                
61 Ibid. p.79 
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person” unless knowledgeable about the shipping industry.62 A more appropriate standard 
would be the expectations of a “reasonable buyer” of the ship as opposed to those of the 
particular buyer.63 
 
Some guidance on the meaning of “satisfactory quality” may be derived from authorities on 
second-hand cars. In Bartlett v. Sidney Marcus Ltd,64 the buyer of a second-hand car 
discovered serious defects in the clutch system a month after purchase. He claimed that the 
car did not meet the satisfactory standard. Lord Denning said that:65 
 
“…the car was far from perfect. It required a good deal of work to be done… But so do 
many second hand cars. The buyer should realise that… defects may appear sooner or 
later… Even when he buys from a dealer the most that he can require is that it should be 
reasonably fit for the purpose of being driven…” 
 
We should also note that price (“if relevant”) and “all other relevant circumstances” should 
also be put into account in assessing whether the goods are of satisfactory quality.66 These 
may well be factors which militate against a ship being held to be of unsatisfactory quality, 
however it depends on the individual case.67 
 
Malcolm Strong in Sale of Ships: The Norwegian Saleform expresses a view that some 
aspects of the goods which are to be assessed with reference to section 14(2)(B) of the 
SGA are difficult to apply to second-hand ships.68 Furthermore he also views that in 
                                                
62 (Strong and Herring 2010) p. 39. 
63 Ibid., see also (Guest 2006) paras 11-031 and 11-032 
64 [1965] 1 W.L.R 1013 
65 Ibid. see at p.1017 
66 (Strong and Herring 2010) p.40 
67 See Clegg v Olle Andersson (T/A Nordic Marine) [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 32 CA: yacht 
sold with an overweight keel was not of satisfactory quality.  
68 (Strong and Herring 2010) p.40  
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regards of the SGA section 14(2)(C) in particular letter (c) the word “ought to reveal” 
makes a scope for argument. The reasonable interpretation of this word is that, “Buyer’s 
examination ‘if properly carried out’ ought to have revealed the defects in issue.” Though 
in practice there could be difficulty in determining what a more thorough inspection would 
actually have revealed.69 
 
2.3.4 Characteristic of fitness for purpose 
 
Characterisation of fitness for purpose is reflected in section 14(3) of the SGA. From that 
section and also by authority in Stevenson v. Rogers,70 it may be said that the sellers of a 
second-hand vessel are selling the goods in the course of their shipping business, even if 
they only sell second-hand vessel at irregular intervals.  
 
Subsequently, the next requirement for this fitness for purpose under the section is that the 
buyer should have made known to the seller any particular purpose for which the goods 
were being bought, this would usually be obvious in the context of the trade. However 
buyers that have a particular trade or voyage pattern in mind may not be disclosed to the 
sellers or referred to in negotiations.71 
 
To succeed under this section, buyers must demonstrate that the sellers have not supplied 
goods “reasonably fit for that purpose”, in other words the purpose made known to the 
sellers. The fact that there is no precise authority in point makes apparent difficulty in 
application of this language to the sale of second-hand vessel. Yet from the case Barlett v. 
Sidney Marcus Ltd mentioned above, a second-hand car was reasonably fit for its purpose 
though requiring repairs. In a more maritime context, a camshaft supplied to a vessel which 
proved unsuited to the engine because of features peculiar to that vessel unknown to either 
                                                
69 Ibid. 
70  [1999] 1 All ER 613 
71 (Strong and Herring 2010) p.41 
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party at the time, but which later worked satisfactorily in another vessel was fit for its 
purpose.72 
 
However, in general, where buyers have tried to rely on the SGA implied terms they have 
preferred to base their case on allegation of unsatisfactory quality under section 14(2) 
rather than unfitness for purpose under section 14(3).73 
 
2.4 Application of SGA Implied Terms into NSF 
 
From the authority of Ernst Behnke v. Bede Steam Shipping Company Ltd74 we can see that, 
under English law, vessels are categorized as goods that fall within the SGA as any other 
piece of machinery or equipment. In the absence of an effective term in the contract which 
clearly excludes their application, it is arguable that the statutory implied terms as to 
satisfactory quality and fitness for purpose will have application in a ship sale contract, 
unless these terms are inconsistent with the express terms of the contract in question.75   
 
If the implied terms are held to apply, then application of the modified terms (with effect 
from 1994) to ships is not necessarily straightforward. To begin with, the implied term in 
the SGA section 14(2) applies to second-hand goods.76 Furthermore, following the case of 
Stevenson v. Rogers, in which the Court of Appeal held that a sale of a fishing vessel was 
“in the course of business” and that habitual dealing was not required, means a “one off 
sale” was still “in the course of business”. 
 
                                                
72 Slater v. Finning Ltd [1997] AC 473 HL; see also Ibid. p.41; see also (Guest 2006) 
paras11-057, 11-058.  
73  (Strong and Herring 2010) p.41. 
74 See Ernst Behnke v. Bede Steam Shipping Company Ltd [1927] 27 Lloyd’s Rep 24 KBD 
75  (Goldrein, Hannaford and Turner, Ship Sale and Purchase 2012) p.255 
76  (Atiyah, Adams and MacQueen 2005) p.168 
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Traditionally, the general assumption is that the provisions of clause 11, especially with the 
words “as she was” (previously “as she is”), are able and sufficient to prevent the SGA 
implied terms from applying. Undoubtedly the position of the buyer will be significantly 
improved should the implied terms, in particular section 14 of the SGA - which according 
to its sub section (6) is regarded as “conditions”, apply to the MOA using the NSF.  
 
However there are two views among key players and practitioners as to whether the SGA 
implied terms apply to the NSF, or whether the express terms in NSF are sufficient to 
exclude the SGA implied terms. Such views are as follows: 
  
2.4.1 NSF able to exclude SGA implied terms 
 
The first view is the people who take the traditional assumption mentioned above, i.e. that 
NSF is able to exclude the application of the SGA implied terms. With this view the buyers 
of second-hand vessel will be subject to various significant limitations on their ability to 
bring claims against the sellers based on the quality of vessel that has been sold to them. 
 
To begin with, in regards to application of the implied terms into the NSF, section 55 of the 
SGA lays down some following tests: 
 
"(1) Where a right, duty or liability would arise under a contract of sale of goods by 
implication of law, it may (subject to the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977) be 
negatived or varied by express agreement, or by the course of dealing between the 
parties, or by such usage as binds both parties to the contract; 
  (2) an express term does not negative a term implied by this Act unless inconsistent with 
it." 
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From an old authority the 1929 case of Lloyd Del Pacifico v. Board of Trade (“Lloyd Del 
Pacifico”),77 the Court of Appeal made findings that the phrase “with all faults and errors 
of description” in the sale contract of a second-hand ship prevented the application of the 
first part of section 14 of the SGA, even though it did not specifically decide that the SGA 
implied terms could not apply to such sale contract. The court was also not impressed by 
the buyer’s argument based on section 14 (2) of the SGA for the implied condition that the 
goods should be of “merchantable quality”. The court rejected such arguments by reference 
to the fact that the ship was sold to “class standards”. 
 
This approach from Lloyd Del Pacifico would also be consistent with other authorities in 
the Morning Watch,78 the Brave Challenger,79 and the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in 
Macleod v. Ens,80 which have defined the term “as is” in a very broad manner which, if it is 
submitted, is sufficient to meet the requirement of an express agreement to negative the 
rights and liabilities which might be implied by the SGA.81 
 
Malcolm Strong in his book mentioned above expresses a view that if the whole of the first 
two sentences of clause 11 in NSF 93 are considered, the case for inconsistency with the 
implied terms looks stronger. The first sentence makes it clear that the starting point is 
delivery of the vessel in the same condition as when inspected. This cannot reasonably be 
interpreted as connoting only a loss of the right to reject, as there is an express reference to 
the vessel’s condition which may well have been a factor in the price and terms which the 
parties have agreed. Furthermore he then said that the word “However” (in line 220) clearly 
qualifies the proposition in the first sentence by introducing specific standards which the 
                                                
77 Lloyd Del Pacifico v. Board of Trade [1930] 36 Lloyd’s Rep.16. 
78 Mariola Marine Corporation v. Lloyd’s Register of Shipping [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.547. 
79 Indigo International Holdings Ltd and another v. The Owners and/or Demise Charterers 
of the vessel “Brave Challenger” [2003] EWHC 3145. 
80 Macleod v. Ens [1983] 135 DLR 365   
81 (Strong and Herring 2010) p.35 
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vessel is to meet, i.e. delivery in Class without condition/recommendation and delivery free 
of average damage.82 
 
In addition, the test for “quality” is fixed by reference to the actual condition of the ship at 
the time of the clause 4 inspection that states the following: 
 
“4. Inspections           30 
a)* The Buyers have inspected and accepted the Vessel's classification records. The Buyers   31 
have also inspected the Vessel at/in on        32 
and have accepted the Vessel following this inspection and the sale is outright and definite,   33 
subject only to the terms and conditions of this Agreement.      34 
b)* The Buyers shall have the right to inspect the Vessel's classification records and declare   35 
whether same are accepted or not within        36 
The Sellers shall provide for inspection of the Vessel at/in      37 
The Buyers shall undertake the inspection without undue delay to the Vessel. Should the   38 
Buyers cause undue delay they shall compensate the Sellers for the losses thereby incurred.  39 
The Buyers shall inspect the Vessel without opening up and without cost to the Sellers.   40 
During the inspection, the Vessel's deck and engine log books shall be made available for   41 
examination by the Buyers. If the Vessel is accepted after such inspection, the sale shall   42 
become outright and definite, subject only to the terms and conditions of this Agreement,   43 
provided the Sellers receive written notice of acceptance from the Buyers within 72 hours   44 
after completion of such inspection.         45 
Should notice of acceptance of the Vessel's classification records and of the Vessel not be   46 
received by the Sellers as aforesaid, the deposit together with interest earned shall be   47 
released immediately to the Buyers, whereafter this Agreement shall be null and void.   48 
* 4a) and 4b) are alternatives; delete whichever is not applicable. In the absence of deletions,  49 
alternative 4a) to apply.          50” 
 
Therefore it is whether, at such time, the ship was of “satisfactory quality” or not. In other 
words, to impose an additional requirement that the ship must be of satisfactory quality is 
to negate the very purpose of the clause 4 inspection and the “as was” test, and is therefore 
inconsistent with the express terms of clause 11 of the NSF 93.83 
                                                
82 (Strong and Herring 2010) p.37 
83 (Goldrein, Hannaford og Turner, Ship Sale and Purchase 2012) p.256 
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2.4.2 NSF insufficient to exclude the implied terms 
 
Practitioners that are of this view contend that while clause 11 of the NSF does set out its 
own quality of benchmark, the express provisions do not go far enough to negate the 
application of the statutory implied terms.84 In other words, it refers to the requirement for 
the strict construction of an exemption clause, so that if the contract does not in terms 
expressly exclude the application of the implied terms in the SGA, they should nevertheless 
apply.85 Similarly, if it is possible to interpret clause 11 as not being inconsistent with the 
additional requirement that the ship be of satisfactory quality, then this ambiguity is 
sufficient in itself to demonstrate that the test under section 55 for the exclusion of the 
statutory implied terms has not been met.86 
 
According to section 14 of the SGA, a term as to satisfactory quality is implied into a 
contract when “the seller sells goods in the course of a business”. In relation with that, from 
the authority in point as previously mentioned,87 a case about a fisherman who sold his 
boat, it was held that the mere fact that a shipowner’s business is the chartering and trading 
of ships, and that a ship sale is only an occasional or unique activity does not mean that 
such a sale is not in the course of that shipowner’s business.    
 
There is nothing in the SGA that limits the application of the implied terms to sale 
contracts of new goods, yet there is still little authority as to application of the implied 
terms to second-hand goods. However, from Bartlett v. Sidney Marcus Ltd,88 it was held 
                                                
84 Ibid. 
85 (Strong and Herring 2010) p.35-36 
86  (Goldrein, Hannaford og Turner, Ship Sale and Purchase 2012) p. 256 
87 Stevenson v. Rogers [1999] 1 All ER 613 
88 [1965] 1 W.L.R 1013 
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that statutory implied terms apply to second-hand goods in regards of the sale of second-
hand car.89 
 
Section 55 (1) of the SGA then contemplates that implied terms may be negated by express 
agreement, by the course of dealing between the parties, or by such usage as binds both 
parties to the contract. Nevertheless, these “course of dealing” and “usage” terms are 
notoriously difficult to prove.90 Therefore in the absence of the said two means, the test 
then comes down to whether the statutory terms are inconsistent with express terms of the 
contract. 
 
In contrast with the decision in Lloyd Del Pacifico mentioned above, an authority from 
Chris Hill Ltd v. Ashington Piggeries91 held that a similar clause, “goods shall be taken 
with all faults and defects, damaged or inferior”, was held to exclude only the right to 
reject. It did not affect the right to claim damages for breach of implied terms. Compared 
with, the phrase “sold as seen and inspected” in relation to a second-hand car were held to 
exclude the implied warranty of merchantable quality under the previous version of the 
SGA (1893).92 On the contrary, a different view was expressed in Cavendish-Woodhouse 
Ltd v. Manley,93 in which “bought as seen” was held to mean simply that the customer had 
seen the goods. However both cases were concerned with offences under the Trade 
Descriptions regulation.94 
 
In London arbitrations, the majority of the awards given have held the statutory terms to be 
implied into Norwegian Saleforms contracts.95 
                                                
89 See (Bridge 2010) p.564  
90 (Crookenden 2008), see also (Strong and Herring 2010) p.36 
91 [1972] AC 441 
92 Hughes v. Hall (1981) RTR 431 
93 Cavendish-Woodhouse Ltd v. Manley 82 LGR 376 
94 (Crookenden 2008) 
95 Ibid. 
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In one arbitration award, the arbitrators reaction to the seller’s argument about the words 
“as she was at the time of inspection” or “as she is at the time of inspection” in NSF 93 or 
NSF 87, as cited by Mr. Crookenden QC (one of the tribunal in the Union Power case) in 
his paper issued before the case arose,96 was: 
 
" We also mention that the sellers' 'as is' argument has no appeal to us. Many sale and 
purchase contracts are on this basis but this is made clear by use of the well-known 
words 'as is', used by those involved in the ship sale and purchase market. No such words 
were in our contract." 
 
The above arguments were of the seller’s that the terms of clause 11 and in particular the 
words “as she was at the time of inspection” have the same meaning as “as is”. Mr. 
Crookenden QC in his aforesaid paper then said that if any case were to be run on the basis 
of a usage, then evidence of such usage would be required. He thought it was difficult to 
see how, if the standard wording of clause 11 is not inconsistent with the statutory terms, 
that a clause stating that the sale is on an "as is" basis is so. Thus, it may be that the 
arbitrators were intending to refer to some usage in the sale and purchase market as to the 
meaning of "as is". However he doubted to a great extent, that there is a sufficiently clear 
and universal meaning attached to the words in the market. 
 
Mr. Crookenden furthermore considered that the arbitrators in the above-mentioned cases 
were correct to hold that the statutory implied terms applied to NSF contracts, and were not 
inconsistent with the express terms of the contract, and that any court would reach the same 
conclusion. The requirement that an express term must be "inconsistent" with the statutory 
terms in order to negate them is a difficult test to overcome. In particular:97 
• The mere fact that the NSF includes detailed provisions regarding the condition of the 
vessel on delivery, which might imply an intention on the part of the contracting 
                                                
96 Ibid. 
97 (Crookenden 2008) 
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parties not to include the statutory terms which overlap substantially with the express 
terms, is insufficient to exclude them; 
• The provisions for inspection in clause 4 are not inconsistent with the statutory terms 
but do provide some protection for any defects which such inspection ought to have 
revealed; 
• The provision in clause 11 that the vessel shall be taken over "as she is at the time of 
inspection" is not inconsistent with the implied terms in that it is not inconsistent with 
a right to claim damages for unsatisfactory quality or unfitness for purpose; and 
• Even an additional clause that the vessel will be delivered "as is" would not in his view 
be inconsistent with the statutory implied terms. Either such a clause could be 
interpreted as a reference back to clause 11 or a mere truism. All goods are delivered 
"as is" at the time of delivery. 
 
The clause held in the Lloyd del Pacifico case to exclude the statutory implied terms might 
well not now be held as sufficient. At that time there was no "inconsistency" test to 
overcome and although "without any allowance or abatement" might reasonably be 
understood to exclude any comeback for unsatisfactory quality, construed strictly, it could 
be limited to excluding abatement or reduction in price but not a claim for damages. On the 
other hand, the effect of Christopher Hill Ltd v. Ashington Piggeries (above) may also 
reasonably be argued as the decision did not intend to set out rigid propositions as to the 
implication of the statutory terms. Sale of toxic animal feedstuff represents a basic failure 
of the purpose of the agreement. Sale of a partially defective second-hand ship is not in the 
same category of contractual failure. On any view the sale of a second-hand ship is a highly 
unusual type of sale of goods contract.98 
 
 
 
                                                
98  (Strong and Herring 2010) p.38 
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3 The Union Power decision 
 
3.1 Background and facts of the case 
 
A dispute arose following the sale of a vessel, a 1994 built motor tanker “Calafuria”, which 
then named “Union Power” (the “Vessel”), for US$7 million in 2009 between Dalmare 
SpA (the “Sellers”) and (1) Union Power Limited; (2) Valor Shipping Limited (the 
“Buyers”).  
 
The Vessel and her records had been inspected by the Buyers in the usual way on 18 
August 2009 in Piraeus and the Buyers’ surveyor found nothing of significance. They 
failed to pick up a reference in the classification records to an incident in October 2002 
relating to damage to the no. 1 crankpin of the main engine. 
 
The parties entered into an MOA based on the NSF 93 on 4 September 2009 with English 
law as prevailing law. As the vessel changed class upon transfer of ownership, it was 
delivered by a new classification society, ABS, to the sellers on 1 October 2009 at Tuzla, 
Turkey pursuant to the MOA. Hereupon a special survey was undertaken also by ABS. She 
was drydocked immediately after delivery, various repairs were carried out and the vessel’s 
third special survey was carried out. As they failed to take reference on that no. 1 crankpin, 
during that survey, they only opened the crankpin bearings of the no. 2 and 4 units and 
were found to be in satisfactory condition. On that basis, ABS credited all of the crankpins 
in good order. In addition the Vessel undertook a sea-trial and, apart from a minor oil leak, 
the main engine operated satisfactorily. 
 
Just over a month later, the Vessel sailed from Tuzla to Malta on a ballast voyage and, only 
some 30 hours after she departed from Tuzla, the main engine broke down. On opening the 
crankcase, it was found that the no. 1 crankpin bearing had failed. The vessel was towed to 
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Greece for investigation and repairs and it was found that the crankpin was significantly 
undersize and oval. 
 
The Buyers commenced arbitration proceedings in London to recover loss and damage 
suffered as a result of the above incident. 
 
After hearing detailed factual and expert evidence, the tribunal (comprising Simon 
Crookenden QC, Michael Baker-Harber and Simon Gault) concluded that the ovality of the 
no. 1 crankpin was the cause of the main engine breakdown. The tribunal also found that 
the ovality had developed to such a state at the time of delivery that the crankpin bearing 
was likely to fail within a short period of normal operation of the main engine after 
delivery of the vessel. 
 
The Buyers argued that, in those circumstances, the sellers were in breach of the MOA 
either because: (1) the ovality was “average damage affecting class” within clause 11; or 
(2) because there was a breach of the implied term as to satisfactory quality implied into 
the MOA by virtue of section 14(2) of the SGA.  
 
The Sellers denied that any SGA terms were to be implied into the MOA. They argued that 
the terms of clause 11 were inconsistent with the SGA implied terms in that the vessel was 
sold “as she was”.  
 
The tribunal rejected Sellers’ arguments and agreed with the Buyers’ on point (2) but 
rejected their argument on point (1) above, holding that the implied term as to satisfactory 
quality was to be implied into the MOA. Therefore the Sellers were in breach of that term 
and the Buyers’ claim succeeded in full. 
 
Upon that decision the Sellers applied for, and on 21 August 2012, obtained permission to 
appeal on the following question of law: 
 34 
“Whether a term as to satisfactory quality is implied into the Contract / MOA by Section 14 
of the Sale of Goods Act 1979?” 
 
For the purposes of that application, it was accepted by the Buyers that the above question 
of law was of general public importance as this question had arisen many times in London 
arbitrations but surprisingly had never been addressed directly by the English courts. 
Therefore The Honourable Mr. Justice Hamblen gave permission on the basis that the 
decision of the tribunal was open to serious doubt. 
 
However, the Seller lost the battle again in this phase. The Court agreed with the tribunal 
and dismissed the appeal. 
 
3.2 The Arbitral Award 
 
As the case was first brought before arbitration, the award given in the process was 
confidential and exclusively intended to the disputing parties. The arbitrators in the 
arbitration were Mr. Simon Crookended QC, Mr. Michael Baker-Haber, and Mr. Simon 
Gault (“the tribunal”), and the award was given on 8 May 2012.  However from the High 
Court decision99 in paragraph [10] we can see the important part of the award (i.e. 
paragraphs [53] to [61]) which deals with the issue as to whether the terms in SGA section 
14 are to be implied into an English law-governed MOA. 
 
The tribunal in the proceedings suggested that at the outset the inconsistency test in section 
55(2) of the SGA needs to be determined. That section 55(2) states that: 
 
“An express term does not negative a term implied by this Act unless inconsistent with it.” 
                                                
99 Dalmare SpA v Union Maritime Ltd & Valor Shipping Ltd (The Union Power) [2012] 
EWHC 3537 (Comm) (13 December 2012) 
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According to the tribunal the above section provides a statutory test as to whether the SGA 
implied terms are negated by express terms in the contract. Therefore the normal rules for 
the construction of a contract, by which a court or tribunal seeks to ascertain the presumed 
intentions of the parties from words they have used,100 do not apply. 
 
The tribunal considered the views taken in the cases of the Morning Watch and the Brave 
Challenger (mentioned above) that an accepted and understood meaning of the phrase “as 
is, where is” is that the purchaser takes a vessel as he finds it, or is a simply truism, 
meaning that clearly any vessel must be as it is and where it is on delivery. On the other 
hand, “as she was” phrase in Saleform 93 does not have the same meaning.  
 
The phrase “as she was” under clause 11 of the SGA 93 was viewed by the tribunal to 
record that as the vessel remains in the possession of the sellers until delivery, the buyers 
were entitled to receive the vessel in the same condition as when inspected. And, save for 
wear and tear, where the vessel was subject to a class condition, recommendation, or an 
average damage affecting class, the seller is contractually obliged to repair and rectify the 
condition or recommendation prior to delivery.  
 
The sale therefore, viewed by the tribunal, is not simply a sale of the vessel at the date of 
inspection. In that case, the phrase “as she was” can be read consistently with the other 
requirements of clause 11 despite the fact that those provisions can require the seller to 
deliver a vessel in a better condition than when inspected. 
 
Consequently, it is difficult to see how SGA terms can be inconsistent with the “as she 
was” phrase in the NSF 93, as the SGA terms if implied can also require the seller to 
deliver a vessel in a better condition than she was when inspected. Therefore the tribunal 
concluded that the SGA terms are not inconsistent with the words “as she was” in clause 11 
                                                
100 This is known as objective approach. English law uses this kind of approach to 
determine the existence of agreement (see Poole (2012) p.26-29). 
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of the NSF 93, and thus the SGA terms as to satisfactory quality are implied into the 
contract. 
 
3.3 The two questions of law 
 
The judge in the High Court, the Honorable Mr. Justice Flaux, noted that the question 
“whether a term as to satisfactory quality is implied into the Contract/MOA by section 14 
of the SGA” had arisen many times in London arbitrations but surprisingly had never been 
addressed directly by the English Court. 
 
In deciding how to approach the question, the judge accepted the Buyers’ submission that 
this required two stages: firstly, to determine whether the MOA was, in fact, an “as is” or 
“as is, where is” contract (assuming that phrase has the effect of excluding the SGA 
implied terms); and secondly, if so, whether the term “as is” or “as is, where is” is 
sufficient to exclude section 14(2) of SGA. The judge referred to these as the ”narrow” and 
“wider” issues respectively. Should the tribunal be right in its analysis, namely that the 
MOA was not equivalent to an “as is, where is” basis of contract, then the appeal must fail 
and the court would not have to decide the second wider question. 
 
3.4 Interpretation of the phrase “As she was …” in the NSF 93 before the 
decision 
 
Before the inception of this High Court decision, most scholars, practitioners, and market 
players in the world of the sale and purchase of second-hand vessels had the view that NSF 
93 and its predecessors is an “as is” or “as is, where is” contract.101 That second-hand ships 
                                                
101 (Strong and Herring 2010) p.157; see also (Falkanger, Bull and Brautaset 2011) p.116: 
”The starting point is that the sale is “as is”, see clause 11. … the ‘as is’ stipulation is 
primarily connected with inspection as per clause 4 letters a and b (cf. lines 225-227).” 
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are bought and sold to a class standard, not to a standard of reasonable quality. As a 
consequence the use of the phrase in clause 11 of the NSF 93 had the effect of excluding 
the implied condition of satisfactory quality as required by section 14(2) of the SGA.102 
 
The main English case authorities for this position are the Morning Watch103 and the Brave 
Challenger.104  
 
Phillips J. set out his obiter views in the said Morning Watch decision as follows:105 
 
“The term ‘as is’ has clearly recognised meaning in a contract of sale. The purchaser takes 
the object sold as he finds it without any warranty as to quality or condition.” 
 
In addition, in the Brave Challenger Steele J considered the term “as is where is” to 
negative any implication of terms under section 14 of the SGA. Apparently a Canadian 
case MacLeod v. Ens106 which was held a decade earlier, came to the same conclusion with 
the position as the Brave Challenger. 
 
Even though the judicial views in the above Morning Watch and Brave Challenger can be 
said to have been given “orbiter”, meaning that they are not strictly part of the main reasons 
for the court’s decision, those decisions accord with generally accepted meaning of this 
term among English lawyers practising in this field: that the buyers take the vessel in the 
condition and state she was in at the point defined in contract, all faults included.107 
 
                                                
102  (Mandraka-Sheppard 2013) ch. 11.9 
103  [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 547 
104 [2003] EWHC 3154 
105 [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 547 pp. 555-556 
106 [1983] 135 DLR 365 
107 (Strong and Herring 2010) p.157 
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It was believed that there would be difficulties in defining what the term “satisfactory 
quality” should properly mean in relation to the sale and purchase of a second-hand ship. 
Particularly where the sale is by reference to a classification standard which has been 
recognised by the court as a minimum standard only.108 Furthermore, the words “as she is” 
are concerned with the Vessel’s condition and not her description. Therefore they have no 
effect on the implication of a condition as to compliance with description under section 13 
of the SGA.109 
 
3.5 Reasoning of the High Court Judge 
 
3.5.1 The Narrow Issue 
 
In answering this narrow issue, namely whether the clause 11 of the NSF 93 was equivalent 
to an “as is, where is” basis contract (assuming that phrase has the effect of excluding the 
SGA implied terms), the judge stressed several important points as follows: 
 
3.5.1.1 The requirement of specific words 
 
Firstly, the judge agreed with the tribunal and made it clear that the correct starting point is 
that the section 14 implied terms of the SGA will apply to a contract for the sale and 
purchase of second-hand goods, including second-hand ships, as to any other English law 
contract for the sale of goods, unless the parties had expressly contracted out of those 
implied terms bearing in mind the requirements of section 55(2) of the SGA.110 There is no 
room for any kind of presumption that the SGA implied terms are inappropriate to a 
commercial contract, nor even that they are easily excluded in a commercial contract. 
                                                
108 Ibid. p.157. 
109 Ibid. p.158. 
110 Ernst Behnke v. Bede Steam Shipping Company Ltd [1927] 27 Lloyd’s Rep 24 KBD 
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However, if commercial parties wanted to exclude the statutory implied term, they were 
free to do so by express and clear words. 
 
In relation to that, the judge pointed out that, as reiterated most recently by Rix LJ in the 
Mercini Lady111 and Cooke J in Air Transworld,112 that a clear language must be used in 
the contract, if the statutory implied terms which are conditions of the contract of sale not 
mere warranties,113 are to be excluded. 
 
The judge concluded and agreed with the tribunal that the obligation that the vessel was to 
be delivered “as she was at the time of inspection” was essentially saying that there should 
be no change in the condition of the vessel between the time of inspection and delivery. 
The phrase said nothing about what the sellers obligations are, either on inspection or 
delivery, in relation with the quality of the vessel. It was only directed to the possibility of 
                                                
111 Bominflot v. Petroplus Marketing (the Merciny Lady) [2010] EWCA Civ 1145 
112 Air Transworld Ltd v. Bombardier Inc [2012] EWHC 243 (Comm). It was a case of sale 
of an aircraft. The contract of sale included a detailed and far ranging exclusion in these 
terms: 
“4.1 THE WARRANTY, OBLIGATIONS AND LIABILITIES OF SELLER AND THE 
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF BUYER SET FORTH IN THE AGREEMENT ARE 
EXCLUSIVE AND ARE IN LIEU OF AND BUYER HEREBY WAIVES AND RELEASES 
ALL OTHER WARRANTIES, OBLIGATIONS, REPRESENTATIONS OR LIABILITIES, 
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARISING BY LAW, IN CONTRACT, CIVIL LIABILITY OR IN 
TORT, OR OTHERWISE, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO A) ANY IMPLIED 
WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNES FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, 
AND B) ANY OTHER OBLIGATION OR LIABILITY ON THE PART OF SELLER TO 
ANYONE OF ANY NATURE WHATSOEVER BY REASON OF THE DESIGN, 
MANUFACTURE, SALE, REPAIR, LEASE, OR USE OF THE AIRCRAFT OR RELATED 
PRODUCT AND SERVICES DELIVERED OR RENDERED HEREUNDER OR 
OTHERWISE.” 
113 See Section 14(6) of the SGA 
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change in condition. On the other hand the term “as is where is” meant the state and 
condition as it is in and where it is in on delivery. Given such requirements for the sellers to 
attend conditions or recommendations, it would not be accurate to describe the sale in 
clause 11 of the NSF 93 as an “as is, where is” basis sales. Therefore they do not and 
cannot exclude the implied term as to satisfactory quality under section of 14(2) of SGA.  
 
Moreover, the fact that the phrase “as she was” was capable of more than one 
interpretation, meant the phrase could not operate as an exclusion clause. The judge cited a 
reaction made by the arbitrators in another arbitration cited by Mr. Crookenden QC (one of 
the tribunals of this case in arbitration) in his aforementioned paper114 as follows: 
 
“ We also mention that the sellers’ ‘as is’ argument has no appeal to us. Many sale and 
purchase contracts are on this basis but this made clear by use of the well-known words 
‘as is’ used by those involved in the ship sale and purchase market. No such words were 
in our contract.” 
 
In this case the judge said to have followed the strict approach to construction of terms 
alleged to exclude the statutory implied terms consistently adopted by the courts, up to and 
including the decision of Cooke J in Air Transworld, that “the fact that even on the sellers’ 
best case the words must have more than one meaning is fatal to the sellers’ case that these 
words exclude the statutory implied terms.” Such implied terms were considered as basic 
principle arising by operation of law, which are valuable to the buyers and which it should 
not be assumed would be lightly given up. The Sellers, however, did not challenge this 
principle which was asserted by the Buyers in the proceedings. 
 
 
 
                                                
114 (Crookenden 2008) 
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3.5.1.2 Inconsistency with the implied terms issue 
 
The judge then said to have agreed with the submissions of the Buyers’ counsel that the 
obligation, as regards class in the second sentence of clause 11 of the NSF 93, do not 
impinge on the obligation to deliver a vessel in a satisfactory quality imposed by the 
implied terms, therefore the inconsistency test was not met. The obligations in regards to 
class in that clause 11 of the NSF 93 was indeed considered to complement or supplement 
the obligation to deliver the vessel in a satisfactory condition rather then being inconsistent 
with it.  
 
This interpretation was considered by the judge as consistent with the principle, “express 
conditions or warranties will normally be construed as additional to the implied terms.”115 
Such express conditions or warranties were deemed as “not qualifying the [implied 
condition] but inserted for the benefit of the buyer.”116 
 
3.5.1.3 Absence of cogent evidence of market custom 
 
In the proceedings the Sellers also argued that the second-hand vessels sold pursuant to 
MOAs on Saleform were simply sold to a class standard, not a standard of satisfactory 
quality under the SGA, as is the market expectation. The judge was unimpressed with this 
argument and considered this as merely an unconvincing assertion, as the Sellers had 
chosen not to present evidence regarding custom and practice in the second-hand vessels’ 
market. The judge noted that from the discussion in the textbook referred by the Buyers’ 
counsel117 the market does not speak with one voice on that issue, and the short answer for 
the expectation of market point is that if the language used in the contract has consequences 
as a matter of English law which “the market” did not intend, then the language used 
                                                
115 (Bridge 2010) para. [11-068] 
116 Bigge v. Parkinson (1862) 7 H & N 955 
117 See (Goldrein, Hannaford and Turner, Ship Sale and Purchase 2008) para. [6.9.3] 
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should be changed to accord with that expectation. Indeed the latest NSF 2012 includes 
wording designed to make it clear that the statutory implied terms are excluded. 
 
In addition according to section 55(1) of the SGA, aside from express agreement, the 
implied terms could also be excluded by evidence of course of dealing or usage. Course of 
dealing or usage is a matter of fact which must be proved by evidence. However to be of 
legal effect, custom or course of dealing must be certain, universal and considered by 
market participants as binding. On the other hand if any case were to be run on the basis of 
usage, then the evidence of such usage would be required. However, it is notoriously 
difficult to prove a “usage”.118 Thus, one can say that to escape from the implied terms is 
not easy. 
 
3.5.1.4 Different meaning of “being in class” and a vessel is of “satisfactory quality” 
 
The court noted that classification does not constitute a guarantee that proper technical 
standards are maintained at all times, or that the ship is free of significant damage or even 
that the ship is seaworthy,119 this was considered by the judge as a basic reason to highlight 
the need for the protection by the implied terms. Bearing in mind that it is a basic principle 
arising by operation of law, which is valuable to the Buyers and which it should not be 
assumed would be lightly given up by the Buyers. However, parties are still at liberty to 
expressly exclude the SGA regime if they so wish.  
 
 
 
                                                
118 (Strong and Herring 2010) p. 36; See also Kum and another v. Wah Tat Bank [1971] 1 
Lloyds Rep. 439 P.C. 
119 (Goldrein, Hannaford and Turner, Ship Sale and Purchase 2012) p.43 
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3.5.1.5 Buyers’ position on the interpretation of “As she was” 
 
As an alternative position the Buyers also relied upon the principle enunciated in 
Christopher Hill Limited v. Ashington Piggeries Limited120 that the first sentence of clause 
11 of the NSF should be read down as excluding the right to reject the vessel whilst not 
precluding the Buyers from claiming damages for breach of the implied term as to 
satisfactory quality. The clause under consideration in that case is provided as follows: 
 
“3. The goods to be taken with all faults and defects, damaged or inferior, if any, at 
valuation to be arranged mutually or by arbitration.”   
 
The judge in that case, Davies LJ, stated in his decision that,  
 
“A clause of this nature must be read strictly, when it is put forward by one party as 
limiting or restricting what would otherwise be the ordinary legal right of the opposite 
party: as here, the plaintiffs’ right to recover for the failure to supply goods corresponding 
with the contractual description. No authority needs to be cited for that well-established 
principle. The words of the clause are capable of being read, and should be read, as 
purporting (whether effectively or not, we need not to say to consider) to exclude the 
buyer’s right to reject the goods for faults and defects; but not as purporting to exclude the 
buyer’s right to recover from the seller compensation for any consequential damage …”   
 
As this approach was approved by the House of Lords,121 the Judge in the Union Power 
then expressed, that if the point had arisen for decision, he would have been prepared to 
read down the first sentence of clause 11 of the NSF 93 in accordance with this 
approach.122 
                                                
120 [1969] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 425 at 468 
121 Dalmare SpA v Union Maritime Ltd & Valor Shipping Ltd (The Union Power) [2012] 
EWHC 3537 (Comm) (13 December 2012) para.75 
122 Ibid para.76 
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3.5.1.6 Conclusion on the narrow issue 
 
Under English law the sale the sale of a ship, whether it is newly built or second-hand, is a 
sale of goods for the purposes of the SGA and accordingly the implied terms of the SGA 
apply to ship sales. The court agreed with the established law that a clear and unequivocal 
language must be used in order to exclude the statutory implied terms. It follows that the 
words “as she was” in the first sentence of clause 11 of the NSF 93 (line 218) merely 
recorded the requirement that the vessel be delivered in the same state as at the time of 
inspection, fair wear and tear excepted. In other words, the buyers were entitled to delivery 
of the vessel in the same condition as when inspected, and where the vessel was subject to 
a Class condition, recommendation, or an average damage affecting class as at the time of 
inspection the seller was contractually obliged to repair, rectify the aforementioned prior 
delivery. 
 
On the other hand, the term “as is where is” meant the state and condition as it is in and 
where it is on delivery. There is no obligation to repair and rectify in a “as is, where is” 
sale.  
 
Given that clause 11 of the NSF 93 required the sellers to attend to a condition, 
recommendation, or an average damage affecting class, they did not have the same impact 
as words such as “as is where is”. The court then concluded that, “the words ‘as she was’, 
in the context of the first sentence of clause 11, are incapable of bearing the same meaning 
as the free-standing words ‘as is, where is’ in a sale contract, assuming for the purpose of 
the argument that those words do exclude the statutory implied terms.” Hence, it is not an 
“as is” provision. 
 
The judge agreed with the tribunal on this matter and this alone should have been enough 
to dispose the sellers’ appeal. 
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3.5.2 The Wider Issue 
 
As the court had reached its conclusion for the narrow issue, it was not necessarily for the 
court to decide the second wider question, namely whether the words “as is” are apt to 
exclude the statutory implied terms as to satisfactory quality and fitness for purpose. 
However the judge made an orbiter comment in regards to the question that may have a 
persuasive value should the issue ever arise in the future.  
 
In answering this question the court’s first approach was to deal with the Sellers’ 
submission that “as is”, in cases such as The Morning Watch is modern shorthand for “the 
[vessel] shall be taken with all faults and errors of description”, and also the clause in 
Lloyd del Pacifico.123 Those cited cases by the Sellers were considered by the court to be an 
assertion only as no evidence had been put before the court by the Sellers about it or about 
the genesis of “as is”.  
 
Furthermore as Davies LJ said in Ashington Piggeries in regards to the “all faults clause” 
that, “[the ‘all faults’ clause] is hallowed by antiquity, if by nothing else. Its words are 
obscure, and its interpretation gave rise to prolonged arguments.”, was considered by the 
court as hardly a promising start for a provision whose modern shorthand is said to exclude 
the statutory implied terms. 
 
Secondly the judge mentioned, that should the exclusion operate it is not encompassing 
everything, as from a reference cited by the judge the words “as is” or “as she is” are only 
concerned with the condition of the vessel not with her description.124 So it is only 
excluding the implication of section 14 of the SGA and not section 13 of the SGA as to 
compliance with description. However the fact of absence of some customary meaning, 
that was still considered by the judge, did not explain how such words are sufficiently clear 
                                                
123 “with all faults and errors of description” 
124 (Strong and Herring 2010) pp.157-158, para.14-10 
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to exclude conditions as to satisfactory quality and fitness for purposes implied by section 
14 of the SGA. From the said reference cited by the judge it can be seen that the words “as 
is” are not a term of art. 
 
Thirdly, even if the argument that the words “as is” are correct to have the effect of 
excluding the SGA implied terms, the fact that those implied terms are condition; as well as 
that the “as is” words do not have a customary meaning; and also are not a term of art, it 
will make a confusion and paradox toward the authorities on the need for clear words to be 
used to exclude statutory implied condition. Such arguments were successfully argued in 
the Air Transworld, while unsuccessfully argued in The Mercini Lady. Those examples 
were considered to have suggested that such words had different meaning than what the 
Sellers had contended. 
 
The judge noted there were no English cases authorities that considered whether the phrase 
“as is” is inconsistent with the statutory implied terms in the light of section 55 (2) of the 
SGA. The aforementioned cases namely, The Morning Watch, The Brave Challenger, and 
the Ashington Piggeries were not of assistance to the issue. Similarly neither were the 
Canadian cases,125 even though they certainly suggest that the term “as is” does normally 
exclude the statutory implied terms completely. However, like The Morning Watch and The 
Brave Challenger, in the absence of some customary meaning they do not analyse how the 
words “as is” can be said to be sufficiently clear and equivocal to exclude the statutory 
implied terms. 
 
However the court did not agree with the Buyers’ submission that the words “as is” do not 
exclude the implied terms at all, saying that it deprives the words of any real meaning and 
reduces them to the truism identified by the tribunal at paragraph [56] of the award. Then 
finally the court leaned towards the approach of the Court of Appeal in the Ashington 
Piggeries case which says that all the words “as is” do, is exclude the right to reject the 
                                                
125 Macleod v. Ens (1983) 135 DLR 3d 365; Smith v. Lasko [1987] 5 WWR 412; Radul v. 
Daudrich [1983] 6 WWR 278. 
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vessel, but leave unaffected the right to claim damages for breach of the implied condition 
as to satisfactory quality. The court viewed that as the context of the statement by Phillips J 
in The Morning Watch.126  
 
In conclusion as the principle and approach of interpretation of the clause in the Ashington 
Piggeries above was approved by the House of Lords, the judge in the Union Power then 
decided a provisional view that “as is” provision should be read down as excluding the 
right to reject the vessel, whilst leaving the right to claim damages for breach of the implied 
terms as to description, satisfactory quality, and fitness for purpose unaffected.  
 
3.6 Discussion 
 
The Union Power decision was the first decision on the application of the SGA implied 
terms to NSF 93. Before this decision, there was a firm understanding in the market that the 
buyers get what they see, subject to vessel being in a class, and free of average damage 
affecting class. But from this decision we can see that apparently the standard wording in 
clause 11 of the NSF 93 (in particular in its first sentence: “… as she was …”) was deemed 
to be insufficient to exclude the implied terms under the SGA. Both the arbitral tribunal 
and the court made clear that this wording did not, in and of itself, exclude the statutory 
implied terms, and found that such wording was only part of a temporal obligation to 
deliver the vessel in the same condition as she was at the time of inspection. No obligations 
of the sellers were mentioned in those words, either on inspection or delivery, in regards of 
the quality of the vessel. Unfortunately the fact that the Sellers complied with this 
obligation (the damage to the crankpin existed already at the time of the inspection and at 
the time of delivery), and that the vessel remained in class, was not considered to be 
inconsistent with the implied terms of the SGA as to the vessel being of satisfactory 
quality.  
 
                                                
126 See footnote no. 105 above. 
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In addition, the Sellers argued that market expectation towards the issue was that second-
hand vessels are bought and sold to a class standard and not a standard of reasonable 
quality. The judge expressed doubt as to whether the market spoke with one voice on that 
issue, noting that no evidence of market practice had been provided before the court. Given 
the fact that the words “as she was” were capable of more than one interpretation and also 
that the sellers had not sought to adduce evidence on the issue, such words could not 
operate as an exclusion clause. 
 
The court also gave a provisional view in regards with the “as is, where is” (or similar 
wording such as “with all faults” or with all faults of description and errors of description” 
or “without warranty”), might not be enough to exclude a seller’s statutory liability under 
the SGA. This wording will only exclude the right to reject a vessel but leaves the right to 
claim damages for breach of statutory implied terms of satisfactory quality and fitness for 
purpose unaffected. This conclusion surely reduces the nature of the said implied terms 
from conditions to warranties. Consequently, the best course of action for a prudent seller 
wishing to exclude statutory quality regime under the SGA is to include express and 
unambiguous wording to the effect that such implied terms are excluded from the 
agreement between the parties. 
 
One other thing that is considered as remarkable and controversial by practitioners was that 
the judge refused to allow the seller to appeal this judgement to the Court of Appeal, with 
consequence that no appeal was possible.127 It is an issue of some general concern that, 
under English law, in cases involving an appeal from an arbitration award, a High Court 
Judge can both decide a matter of the present type and determine whether his judgement 
can be reviewed by a higher court.128  
 
Moreover it is difficult to imagine how the standard of “satisfactory quality” will be set up 
or applicable for a second-hand vessel that has been in trading for decades. 
                                                
127 (Herring and Khan 2013); See also (Curtis 2013) 
128 (Curtis 2013) 
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However a judge in a Norwegian Court may have a different approach in resolving the 
above case. The former managing director of Nordisk, Mr. Georg Scheel, said in one 
article129 that, “While these judgements may be logical and well-reasoned from a legal 
point of view, a Norwegian court would normally give considerable more weight to 
information about the perception of the legal position in the market, and assume that the 
parties intended to make a contract in accordance with this general understanding.” He 
continued to say, “In England, such commercial arguments seem to be of lesser 
importance, and the requirements for submitting evidence of a relevant market practice 
seem to be stricter than in Norway.” Looking to his comments, it seems that Norwegian 
court would apply subjective approach in determining the existence of agreement. 
 
Note that in The Rainy Sky,130 the UK Supreme Court confirmed the principle laid down in 
Wickman v. Schuler131 that, if the words of a contract have an ambiguous meaning, the 
court will interpret them in a manner that most accords with "business common sense". 
There is no requirement for a party to prove that the alternative interpretation is entirely 
unreasonable. It seems that this approach was not replicated, both in arbitration and in the 
High Court in the Union Power case.  
 
The relevance of this decision extends beyond ship sale and purchase contracts, since the 
SGA may well imply terms into all “as is” contracts for the sale and purchase of goods 
governed by English law, unless expressly excluded. This decision also enlarges the rights 
of the buyer beyond the express terms contained in NSF 93 and also other sale and 
purchase of goods contracts. 
                                                
129 (Mulrenan 2013) 
130 Rainy Sky SA and others v. Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50  
131 [1973] UKHL 2   
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4 Interpretation of “As is, where is” in subsequent English Court 
decision of Hirtenstein case and the Entire Agreement provision 
in the MOA 
 
4.1 Interpretation of “As is, where is” in subsequent English Court 
decision, the Hirtenstein  
 
The Union Power case has sparked some controversy, given that it seemed to run contrary 
to the commercial expectations. Following the said decision, there has been a recent new 
English court decision namely Michael Hirtenstein, Il Sole Limited v. Hill Dickinson 
LLP132 (the “Hirtenstein”), which contradicts the decision made in the Union Power in 
interpreting the term “As is, where is”.	  
 
The main issues in the dispute are actually not relevant to the Union Power case. However 
what is of interest is the Judge’s observation on the meaning of “as is, where is” and the 
decision in the Union Power. 
 
4.1.1 Brief overview on the Hirtenstein decision and background of the case 
 
This case was about a dispute arising from a Cayman Island businessman, Michael 
Hirtenstein in relation to the purchase of a second-hand motor yacht, namely Il Sole, for £ 
3.6 million from UK property developer Christian Candy. The yacht Il Sole had been sold 
to a company of which Mr. Hirtenstein was the beneficial owner. Mr. Hirtenstein agreed to 
buy the yacht “as is, where is”, and planned to propose to his girlfriend on board. 
 
The transaction was arranged in a short timeframe. The yacht was offered to Mr. 
Hirtenstein on 12 July 2010. And just one day after that Mr. Hirtenstein instructed his 
                                                
132 [2014] EWHC 2711 (Comm)   
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solicitors, Hill Dickinson, to act for him and requested that the sale to be completed by 16 
July 2010.    
 
Notwithstanding the short time scale, the transaction was successfully completed by 14:14 
on 16 July 2010. An hour or so afterwards, there was a major failure of the yacht’s 
starboard engine. Substantial repair works were needed. 
 
Mr. Hirtenstein sought to recover his losses first from Mr. Candy (the selling company 
having been liquidated) and then from his solicitors on the grounds of negligence. 
 
The Il Sole had been purchased from its previous owner, Candyscape Ltd., a special 
purpose company in turn owned by a Mr Candy. Although the yacht had been sold on an 
“as is, where is” basis, Mr. Hirtenstein’s solicitors (the “Defendants”) had been able to 
negotiate a limited warranty from Candyscape Ltd., promising that the yacht was in “good” 
mechanical condition. However, Mr Hirtenstein’s potential claim for breach of warranty 
against Candyscape Ltd. was, in reality, worthless. The yacht had been the company’s only 
major asset, and it was now in liquidation.133 
 
However, Mr. Hirtenstein had been told by the Defendants, not long after contractually 
committing himself to buy the yacht, that a personal guarantee from Mr. Candy had been 
obtained. It was said that this guarantee covered Candyscape Ltd.’s warranty that the yacht 
was in good mechanical condition. 
 
And so it was that Mr. Hirtenstein instituted proceedings against Mr Candy, claiming under 
the guarantee. However, in preparing that claim, the Defendants realised that they had 
made a mistake. Contrary to what they had previously believed, it transpired that the 
guarantee did not cover Candyscape Ltd.’s warranty. Any claim against Mr. Candy under 
the guarantee, because that warranty had been breached, would fail. Mr. Hirtenstein 
                                                
133 (Scrivener 2014) 
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accordingly started proceedings against the Defendants, arguing that they had negligently 
failed to obtain a guarantee which was wide enough to apply to breaches of the warranty. 
 
The Defendants, represented by Nigel Tozzi QC and James Leabeater of 4 Pump Court, 
accepted that they were negligent in having thought that there was a personal guarantee 
from Mr Candy wide enough to cover Candyscape Ltd.’s warranty. However they denied 
that Mr Hirtenstein had suffered any loss. They argued that, even if they had asked for a 
guarantee which covered the warranty, Mr. Candy would not have provided one. 
 
In giving judgment, Leggatt J. agreed that the defendants had been negligent in thinking 
there was a guarantee which applied to the warranty. Whilst a reasonably competent 
solicitor could have decided to not seek a guarantee from Mr. Candy, so as to ensure the 
transaction successfully went ahead, such a solicitor would also have told Mr. Hirtenstein 
of this decision. That had not happened here, and a breach of duty was established. 
 
This conclusion was, however, only a pyrrhic victory for Mr. Hirtenstein. Leggatt J. went 
on to find that, even if the Defendants had asked for a guarantee which covered the 
warranty, Mr. Candy would not have given one. Since Mr. Hirtenstein would have gone 
ahead with the transaction even had he known there was no such guarantee, the 
Defendants’ negligence had not caused any loss and therefore the plaintiff was entitled to 
judgment for only nominal damages.134 
 
4.1.2 Interpretation of “As is, where is” in the Hirtenstein decision 
 
Although the main issues in the dispute are actually not relevant to the Union Power case, 
what is interesting is the court’s interpretation of the “as is, where is” phrase in 
approaching the issues of liability and causation of the case. The sale was affected by a 
Memorandum of Agreement on the Mediterranean Yacht Brokers Association (“MYBA”) 
                                                
134 Ibid. 
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standard terms, which expressly excludes every “representation, condition or 
warranty…implied by statute”. Such wording makes no prospect that any term as to 
satisfactory quality could be implied by virtue of the SGA. The judge saw an opportunity to 
comment on the controversial judgment, namely the Union Power, regarding the 
implication of such terms where a sale is expressed to be on an “as is, where is” basis. 
 
The judge’s observation on the meaning of “as is, where is” is expressed in paragraphs 51-
56 of the decision.135 
 
Firstly the court noted that, the Yacht was offered for sale to Mr. Hirtenstein, and he agreed 
in principle to buy it "as is, where is". Leggatt J regarded that phrase as self-explanatory 
and clearly signified that the buyer would acquire the Yacht in whatever condition the boat 
was in at the time of purchase with no right to complain subsequently if the boat should 
turn out to have any defect. 
 
This was considered by the court as the exact interpretation that Mr Hirtenstein understood 
as he explained in evidence, "I didn't know at the time what in the boat world that meant 
from a legal standpoint. I took it … almost like a property sort of thing, where I would be 
buying it with the way it is. … I am buying it with its beauty and the warts."136 
 
The court also noted that Mr Hirtenstein's understanding was also apparent at the time. In 
an email which Mr Hirtenstein sent to Mr. Candy on 12 July 2010 at 11.13, he confirmed 
his agreement to buy the Yacht on Mr Candy's terms and emphasised his enthusiasm for 
the deal by stating: "My word is as good as a signed contract." Mr Hirtenstein went on to 
say, "Let me know your thoughts or what subtleties I may want to know about the boat 
since I understand I am taking her 'as is, where is'."137 
 
                                                
135 Michael Hirtenstein, Il Sole Limited v. Hill Dickinson LLP [2014] EWHC 2711 (Comm)   
136 Ibid. para 52 
137 Ibid. para 53 
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Leggatt J at this point took that Mr Hirtenstein here to be acknowledging that he was taking 
the risk of any fault in the Yacht's condition and appealing to Mr Candy as a fair and 
honourable person to tell him of any fault or imperfection known to Mr Candy of which a 
buyer would want to be aware. 
 
Mr Hirtenstein's understanding of what it meant to buy the Yacht "as is, where is" was 
shared by a solicitor who is very experienced in this field, namely Mr. Lawson. It would 
appear also to have been consistent with the general understanding in the yacht trade. That 
was evidenced by a standard form of addendum to the MYBA MOA which is used for "as 
is, where is" sales. This addendum provides that the buyer waives any right to a sea trial or 
condition survey and that "all express or implied warranties or conditions statutory or 
otherwise are hereby excluded". 
 
The judge then referred to the provisional view expressed in the Union Power case by 
Flaux J that the words "as is" when included in a contract for the sale of goods are not by 
themselves sufficient to exclude the conditions as to satisfactory quality and fitness for 
purpose implied by the Sale of Goods Act, and only exclude the right to reject the goods 
for breach of those conditions. Leggatt J further stated that, “In a contract between 
commercial parties such an interpretation would seem to me to be generous to the buyer. 
Drawing such a distinction between the right to reject and the right to damages and 
treating the words "as is" as excluding the former but not the latter seems to me most 
unlikely to reflect the expectations of ordinary business people or to be an interpretation 
that would occur to anyone other than an ingenious lawyer.”138  
 
The judge then concluded the discussion and settled without hesitation that Mr. Hirtenstein, 
Mr Candy, their solicitors, and the broker all understood that buying the Yacht "as is, 
where is" meant that Mr. Hirtenstein would get the Yacht in its existing condition, good or 
bad, with no subsequent recourse against the seller for any fault which the Yacht might turn 
out to have. 
                                                
138 Ibid. para.55 
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4.2 Implication of the outset of Hirtenstein decision 
 
The Hirtenstein decision seems to support the view that the terms “as is” or “as is where is” 
are terms of art when it comes to sale of goods contracts, and that such terms are 
inconsistent with any right of recourse in regards to the condition of the goods, they are 
therefore inconsistent with the statutory implied terms under section 14 of the SGA. 
 
However, the Union Power is still an authority for the issue that the words “as she was” in 
clause 11 of the NSF 93 are not the same as “as is, where is” and do not of themselves 
exclude the SGA implied terms. Nevertheless, since neither the judge in the Union Power 
case nor in the Hirtenstein case gave decisive judgments, the question as to whether “as is, 
where is” on its own is sufficient to exclude SGA remains unclear. As a result the public 
still have no clear authorities in regards to this matter and on what are the buyers’ rights in 
the event of breach in a “as is” contract. 
 
Given the uncertainty until there is a binding decision, the best possible course is still to 
expressly exclude the statutory implied terms of satisfactory quality and fitness for purpose, 
if that is intended by the parties. 
 
4.3 The Entire Agreement Clause in the NSF 2012 
 
4.3.1 Introduction 
 
Many scholars and practitioners consider and suggest that the NSF 2012 version as a 
solution to the ambiguity of the issue - whether the clause 11 in the NSF 93 is sufficient to 
exclude the SGA implied terms as to satisfactory quality and fitness for purpose, because 
the NSF 2012 version has the so-called Entire Agreement clause.    
 
 56 
Under the NSF 2012, the Entire Agreement clause is expressed in clause 18. The full 
wording of the clause is as follows: 
 
“18. Entire Agreement                    400 
The written terms of this Agreement comprise the entire agreement between the Buyers and      401 
The Sellers in relation to the sale and purchase of the Vessel and supersede all previous        402 
 agreements whether oral or written between the Parties in relation thereto.                   403 
Each of the Parties acknowledges that in entering into this Agreement it has not relied on and          404 
shall have no right or remedy in respect of any statement, representation, assurance or          405 
warranty (whether or not made negligently) other than as is expressly set out in this Agreement.   406 
Any terms implied into this Agreement by any applicable statute or law are hereby excluded to         407 
the extent that such exclusion can be legally made. Nothing in this Clause shall limit or exclude   408 
any liability for fraud.                       409” 
 
This Entire Agreement clause has just been inserted in the NSF 2012 and did not appear in 
NSF previous versions including in the earlier NSF 93. However it is not entirely clear 
whether the reason for inserting this Entire Agreement clause was as a response to conform 
with the market expectation, namely that the second-hand vessels sold pursuant to MOAs 
on Saleform were simply sold to a class standard, not a standard of satisfactory quality 
under the SGA. Yet the revision of the NSF 93 was made and it was considered by the 
public as an improvement of the NSF 93.  
 
4.3.2 The purpose of the Entire Agreement clause in the NSF 2012 
 
In the Union Power decision the judge agreed that one of the two routes for the parties of 
sale contracts to be able to have contracted out the implied terms under the SGA is by using 
a clear and unequivocal statement of an alternative regime as to quality, which was wholly 
inconsistent with the section 14(2) implied term as to satisfactory quality, such as an entire 
agreement clause.139  
                                                
139 Dalmare SpA v Union Maritime Ltd & Valor Shipping Ltd (The Union Power) [2012] 
EWHC 3537 (Comm) (13 December 2012) para.24 
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From clause 18 of the NSF 2012 we can conclude that the purposes of the Entire 
Agreement clause in the NSF 2012 are as follows: 
 
Firstly, the lines 401 – 403 of clause 18 in NSF 2012 provide that the terms of the contract 
shall supersede all previous oral or written agreement between the parties in relation to the 
sale and purchase of the ship. Therefore the two main purposes of the provisions in these 
lines are to prevent the presumption that the written contract contains all of the terms of the 
agreement from being displaced, and also to prevent one of the parties from relying on pre-
contract statements or documents to add to, vary, or contradict the term of the written 
contract (for example, by contending that a pre-contractual statement or document creates a 
collateral warranty or some other form of side agreement).140 
 
Secondly, lines 404 – 406 of the clause are designed to exclude the liability of a party for 
pre-contractual representation that has not been incorporated as terms of the sale contract or 
commonly know as “mere representation” in legal terms. Nevertheless, these non-reliance 
provisions may not be effective if, for example, the author of the representations actually 
knew that its counterparty was relying on pre-contractual representations not set out in the 
contract. This reinforces the need for an express exclusion of liability in relation to pre-
contractual representations not set out in the contract, in addition to a non-reliance 
provision. These lines seek to address both the non-reliance point and to expressly provide 
that neither party shall have any right or remedy in respect of pre-contractual statements 
that are not expressly set out in the contract. However this clause 18 will not operate to 
exclude or limit any liability of fraud.141 
 
And lastly, lines 407 – 409 seek to exclude any terms that might otherwise be implied into 
the contract by operation of applicable statute of law. While the provision has been drafted 
in general terms as to reflect the aim of the NSF to be able to work under any system of 
                                                
140 (Goldrein, Hannaford and Turner, Ship Sale and Purchase 2012) p.253 
141 Ibid. pp.254-255.  
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law, its inclusion is intended specifically to address the terms as to satisfactory quality and 
fitness for purpose implied by the SGA.142 
 
4.3.3 Implication of the Entire Agreement clause of the NSF 2012 towards the 
issue of excluding the statutory implied terms of the SGA 
 
With the outset of the NSF 2012 in February 2012 containing the Entire Agreement clause 
in clause 18, in particular in lines 407 – 409, it is viewed that this version of NSF is able to 
exclude the SGA regime. Further to that because of its alleged effectiveness, it is also 
considered that parties can also adopt the wording in this clause 18 of NSF 2012 in the NSF 
93 to exclude the SGA implied terms, if they wish to use the NSF 93. 
 
Accordingly sellers who use the NSF 2012 with its standard clause 18 should be safe from 
the risk of claims from the buyer in relation to defects coming to light after delivery. 
Conversely, buyers of second-hand vessels that would like to rely on the statutory implied 
terms will need to amend the NSF 2012 to include such terms. 
 
According to NSF 2012 Explanatory Notes, the Entire Agreement clause in NSF 2012 
should remove the uncertainty concerning the sale of ships under English law and a 
potential obligation on the sellers to ensure that the vessel is of a “satisfactory quality and 
fit for purpose”, a difficult obligation to meet, as well as under any other applicable law 
which could otherwise open up for implied warranties. Therefore it should effectively 
exclude the implied terms of the SGA.143 
 
However until there is a decisive judgment from the court, it is difficult to be 100% certain 
on the issue of whether clause 18 effectively excludes the impled terms of the SGA. 
                                                
142 Ibid. p.255. 
143 (Saleform 2012 Explanatory Notes n.d.) 
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5 Conclusions and Further Suggestions 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
 
In light of the above discussion towards the problem matters raised, we can sum up the 
following: 
 
1. The Union Power case is an authority for the proposition that the words ”as she was” 
in section 11 of the NSF 93 are not the same as “as is, where is” and do not of 
themselves exclude the SGA implied terms. From the said decision the judge agreed 
that the starting point was that the sale of a ship is a sale of goods for the purposes of 
the SGA and accordingly the implied terms of the SGA apply to ship sales, unless it is 
expressly excluded. The court agreed with the established law that a clear and 
unequivocal language must be used in order to exclude the statutory implied terms.  
 
Furthermore, the words “as she was” in clause 11 of the NSF 93 are a necessary part of 
a sentence which is recording the obligation to deliver the vessel in the same condition 
as she was when inspected. Such words are part of a temporal obligation which arises 
because, usually, there will be a period of time between inspection and delivery. No 
obligations of the sellers are expressed by those words, either on inspection or 
delivery, as regards the quality of the vessel. On the other hand, the phrase “as is, 
where is” means that the purchaser takes a vessel as he finds it, or in other words, 
clearly a vessel must be as it is and where it is on delivery.  
 
In addition, the further obligations of the sellers in clause 11 to repair, rectify or delete 
the vessel prior to delivery of a class condition, recommendation, or an average 
damage affecting class, where the vessel was subject to any of them can be read 
consistently with other requirements of clause 11 of the NSF 93. Similarly the SGA 
regime, if implied, can also require the seller to deliver a vessel in a better condition 
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than she was when inspected. Such consistency made the inconsistency test set out in 
the section 55(2) irrelevant.  
 
Therefore the Judge concluded that the words “as she was” in the context of the first 
sentence of clause 11, are incapable of bearing the same meaning as the free-standing 
words “as is, where is” in a sale contract, assuming for the purpose of the argument 
that those words do exclude the statutory implied terms. Admittedly statutory implied 
terms as to satisfactory quality and fitness for purpose are implied into the NSF 93 
through Section 14 of the SGA.  
 
2. With the inception of the Hirtenstein decision, now we have two contradictory 
judgements regarding whether the words “as is”, if they had been included in the sale 
contracts, would have been sufficient to exclude the statutory implied terms as to 
satisfactory quality and fitness purpose. 
 
In the Union Power the judge expressed a view that there was considerable force in the 
argument of the buyer that the words “as is” are not expressly inconsistent with the 
statutory implied terms so as to exclude them. Conversely, the judge felt that to 
interpret them as not excluding the implied terms at all would deprive them of any real 
meaning. Therefore the judge expressed a provisional view that the words would 
exclude the right to reject the vessel but leaving the right to claim damages for breach 
of implied terms unaffected. This view surely reduces the weight of statutory implied 
terms from conditions to warranties. 
 
On the contrary, in the Hirtenstein the judge viewed the phrase “as is, where is” as 
self-explanatory and clearly signified that the buyer would acquire the Yacht in 
whatever condition the boat was at the time of purchase, with no right to complain 
subsequently if the boat should turn out to have any defect. He considered that the 
judge’s provisional view in the Union Power was generous to the buyer and that 
treating the phrase “as is” as excluding the right to reject the vessel, but not the right to 
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claim damages for breach of the implied terms, was unlikely to reflect the “expectation 
of ordinary business people.”  The Hirtenstein case therefore supports the view that the 
terms “as is” or “as is where is” are “terms of art” when it comes to contracts for the 
sale of goods. Further that such terms are inconsistent with any further right of 
recourse in respect to the condition of the goods, as well as that they are therefore 
inconsistent with the implication of warranties under section 14 of the SGA. 
 
3. Since both of decisions in  the Union Power or in the Hirtenstein were provisional and 
indecisive the best possible course to exclude the statutory implied terms of 
satisfactory quality and fitness for purpose is still by using a clear, express, 
unequivocal and unambiguous wording as in the case of Air Transworld,144 or by a 
clear and unequivocal statement of an alternative regime as to quality which is wholly 
inconsistent with the implied terms in section 14(2) of the SGA, such as an entire 
agreement clause, if that is intended by the parties.  
 
5.2 Further Suggestions  
 
In regards to the current situation where there are two English Commercial Court cases 
with apparently contradictory view points, both buyers and sellers should exercise caution 
when entering into sale and purchase agreements.   
 
In case of a situation where a buyer wishes to have the protection of the SGA it is 
recommended that the sale and purchase contract is concluded on the NSF 93, in which 
case in the event there is a post-delivery default they will be able to sue for damages to the 
sellers. Alternatively, the buyer can conclude the sale and purchase contract using the NSF 
2012 version, but exclude clause 18 so that they can still sue damages to the seller for post-
delivery breach. 
 
                                                
144 [2012] EWHC 243 (Comm) 
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Conversely, in the event that the seller wishes an immunity from being sued by buyers for 
post-delivery breach as regards to satisfactory quality and fitness for purpose, it would be 
prudent for sellers to expressly exclude the statutory implied terms of the SGA (Section 
14), by expressly contracting out as in the case of the detailed clause considered by Cooke J 
in Air Transworld Ltd,145 or by a clear and unequivocal statement of an alternative regime 
as to quality which is wholly inconsistent with the section 14(2) of the SGA, such as an 
entire agreement clause. It is also safer for the parties to conclude the sale and purchase 
contract by using MOA based on an unamended NSF 2012 (or perhaps to amend it to make 
it even clearer) where the seller cannot face claims for unsatisfactory quality and fitness for 
purposes under English law. The 2012 version of the Norwegian Saleform purports to do 
that by means of a general exclusion of all implied terms under clause 18. 
 
However the effectiveness of NSF 2012, in particular its clause 18, in excluding the 
statutory implied terms as to satisfactory quality and fitness for purpose under SGA still 
needs to be tested by a future English Court decision. Until then it is difficult to be 100% 
certain on the issue of whether clause 18 effectively excludes the implied terms of the SGA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
145 [2012] EWHC 243 (Comm); see also footnote no. 112 above. 
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